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Occupational Safety and Health:
Environmental Justice for the
Forgotten American
By JOSEPH A. PAGE* AND GARY B. S u.s °*
For the agony of the crushed arm, for the torment of the
scorched body, for the delirium of terror in the fall through
endless hollow squares of steel beams down to the death-
delaying construction planks of the rising skyscraper, for
the thirst in the night in the hospital, for the sinking qualms
of the march to the operating table, for the perpetual
ghostly consciousness of the missing limb-for these things
and for the whole hideous host of things like them, fol-
lowing upon the half million accidents that happen to
American working men every year, there can be no compen-
sation.'
And, well, my father worked in a chemical plant right next
door to the one I work for; about twenty years. He's dead
now. I had an uncle; he also worked in a chemical plant,
the same plant right next door to me. He died of cancer,
this cancer in the throat. He had a tube in his throat, and it
was as a result of working in this chemical plant; he didn't
have it before he went there. But a certain chemical that he
inhaled, got in his throat and his throat was a mess and he
died. I mean, I don't use the expression-he died like a dog
...... We're a small bunch but we've got a problem.
These chemicals are going to kill us all.
2
* Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center.
** Counsel, Center for the Study of Responsive Law; Consultant to Rep.
Philip Burton of California.
I Hard, The Law of the Killed and Wounded, EvEmanoDY's MAGAzIN, Sept.
1908, at 361.
2 Harold Smith, Local 8-447, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int'l Union,
quoted in Hazards of the Industrial Environment, transcript of a conference spon-
sored by District 8 Council, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Intl Union,
Kenilworth, N.J., March 29, 1969, at 58-59; reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 843,
H.R. 8809, H.R. 4294, H.R. 18373, Before the Select Subcomm. on Labor of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1293-3
(1969).
SYNPOSIM ON WORKIVxEN'S COIPENSAUON
Dormant for nearly six decades, the issue of occupational safety
and health has begun to stir anew the national conscience.8 Once
again voices are being raised against the gratuitous, unjust and
unnecessary contribution American workers and their families are
making to industrial prosperity and growth-a private subsidy
paid to employers and coined in blood, broken bones, broken
health, physical pain, mental anguish, and the ultimate trauma of
death.
At the turn of the twentieth century, the human toll exacted
by industry provoked a great public outcry. A talented corps of
muckraking authors described in vivid terms the unsafe, unhealthy
conditions of America's factories and workshops.4 They deplored
the financial hardships suffered by the disabled worker and his
family. In this era of rapid industrialization the frequency,
severity and sequelae of work accidents were appalling. Injured
workers could seldom obtain compensation from their employers
and had to deplete their own meager savings and even turn to
public relief to defray the costs of their accidents. The dehuman-
izing effects of this process were unworthy of a civilized nation.
The clamor for reform culminated in 1911 with the passage
of the first state workmen's compensation acts, designed to shift
to the employer most of the financial cost of work-connected
injuries and deaths.5 This economic burden, it was supposed,
would force employers to provide for the safety of their workers,
and thus serve a preventive as well as a compensatory function.
3 See, e.g., Industrial Safety: The Toll of Neglect, Tmm, Feb. 7, 1969, at 76-
Rugaber, Records Show That Lax Government Regulations Allow Occupational
Hazards to Grow, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1970, at 17, col. 1; Mintz & O'Toole, Indus-
trial Hazards Exact a Rising Toll, Washington Post, Dec. 28, 1969, et al., col. 5;
O'Toole & Mintz, Industrial Hazards Foster "Silent Kind of Violence," id., Dec. 29,
1969, et al., col. 4; O'Toole & Mintz, Virtual Indifference to Job Safety Accom-
panies Rise in Casualties, id., Dec. 30, 1969, et al., col. 3.
4 The classic of the genre is U. SiNcrAn, ThE JUNGLE (1906, Airmont ed.
1965), which describes conditions in the meat-packing plants of Chicago. See also
Dosch. Just Wos, EvRYnoDys MAGAzNE, Nov. 1911, at 579; Hard, The Law of
the Killed and tha Wounded, id., Sept. 1908, at 361; Hard, Pensioners of Peace, id.,
Oct. 1908 at 522; Hard, Making Steel and Killing Men, id., Nov. 1907, at 579;
Packer, The Hazards of Industry: Should the Workman Bear the Whole Burden?,
OutLoo, June 5, 1909, at 319; What If You Kill a Man?, Wona_'s WoRa, Nov.
1910, at 13602; Buying a Man's Arm: By the Corporation Lawyer Who Made the
Purchase, A-msncAN MAGAZZIE, July 1909, at 260.
S General discussions of the history and goals of workmen's compensation may
be found in E. CE=r, INjURny AND REcovERY iN mx CoUsE OF EmToLOP M
10-13 (1961); 1 A. LARSON, TH LAws OF WORKMMN'S COMI-ENSATION §§ 1-5
(1964); H. SoMERs & A. SOMERS, WOR MEN'S COMPENSATION: PREVENbON, IN-
sURANCE AND REHABIr o N OF OccuPATIONA.L DisAnlm=Y 17-37 (1954).
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Within the next decade most states enacted compensation
statutes,6 and industrial groups initiated well-publicized safety
campaigns.7 These steps served to blunt the thrust of the critics.
Accident rates began to subside somewhat8 (the inevitable result
of instituting the most rudimentary and inexpensive safety prac-
tices, which had previously been ignored), and the limited
number of workers covered by the new acts began to receive
limited benefits for employment injuries. The muckrakers turned
to other causes as 1911 assumed the aura of a landmark year in
the history of American social legislation.
For more than half a century the broad issue of occupational
safety and health languished. The National Safety Council, a
private group dominated by industry, published annual statistics
which showed the dimensions of the problem diminishing,9 and
these figures were uncritically accepted by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics and other federal and state agencies concerned with
accident prevention. 10 The labor movement gradually developed
into a powerful political force responsible for promoting the in-
terests of the worker. But the unions failed to gather their own
data on industrial accidents and diseases. They also failed to
put effective pressure on the federal and state governments to
strengthen and enforce existing legislation which was supposed
to protect the working man."- The social security laws came into
existence and were expanded to cover death and permanent total
disability' 2-thus helping to relieve discontent with the inadequate
benefit levels of workmen's compensation.
Suddenly in 1968 the hazards of the workplace re-emerged
as matters of national concern. On January 23, President Lyndon
B. Johnson delivered to the Congress a message on manpower
and job training which included a reference to the problem of
industrial safety and a declaration that, "It must be our goal to
6 Id.
7 See Palmer, History of the Safety Movement, 123 ANNArs 9 (Jan. 1926).
8 See note 127 infra.
9 See J. TuaRNBuL, C. Wmrtmms & E. CHar=, EcoNoNaUc AND SocIm
SEcumrrY 284 (2d ed. 1962).
10 See notes 30-41 infra, and accompanying text.
11 The role of the labor movement in the struggle for occupational safety and
health will be discussed at considerable length in the full NADER REPoRT oN Oc-
cUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HALTH.
12 SeeDPOL LK, DisAnBpry INs URANcE UNDER Socrijo SEcuarr, n- Occu-
PATIONAL DISABILIT AND PtLIc Pouc 158 (Cheit & Gordon eds. 1963); J.
TURNBuLL et. al., supra note 9, at ch. 4.
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protect every one of America's seventy-five million workers while
they are on the job."' 3 The Johnson administration then sponsored
the introduction of legislation which sought for the first time a
comprehensive involvement by the federal government in the
battle against industrial accidents and diseases.
On February 1, 1968, the Select Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Education and Labor held the first of a series of
hearings on the subject. 4 Two weeks later the Subcommittee on
Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
began a similar investigation. 5 These and subsequent hearings
in 1969"s and 197017 produced a mass of data which revealed and
documented major shortcomings in various public and private
programs for the prevention and compensation of work accidents
and diseases.
Appreciation of the seriousness of the occupational safety and
health problem has been gradually spreading. The recent bur-
geoning of both the consumer and ecology movements has un-
doubtedly helped. Indignation at hazards posed to consumer by
defective products can readily shift to the daily risks endured by
men and women engaged in production. Alarm at the deterior-
ation of the nation's natural environment relates easily to the in-
creasing dangers inherent in the work environment. A common
thread which binds those who advocate consumer protection,
conservation and occupational safety and health is that they all
seek to curb the excesses of modern technology and to make
corporate power responsive, to the public interest.
The resurgence of the movement for occupational safety and
health has been aided by the dramatic publicity generated by the
coal mine explosion which caused seventy-eight fatalities in Farm-
ington, West Virginia, on November 20, 1968, and the subsequent
agitation by miners demanding compensation for "black lung"
13 114 CONG. REc. S589, H688 (Jan. 23, 1968).
14 See Hearings on H.R. 14816, Before the Select Subcomm. on Labor of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), [hereinafter
cited as 1968 House Hearings].
15 See Hearings on S. 2864, Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
1o See Hearings on H.R. 893, H.R. 8809, H.R. 4294 H .R 18378, Before the
Select Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), [hereinafter cited as 1969 House Hearings].
17 See Hearings on S. 2193, S. 2788, Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1969-70),
[hereinafter cited as 1969-70 Senate Hearings].
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disease and better safety standards for the mines. 8 Congressional
hearings, 9 the passage of the federal Coal Mine Safety Act20 and
recent attempts to secure the enforcement of the Act2' have kept
public attention focused on the coal mines, and serve as a constant
reminder of a larger, more significant problem: the safety and
health of every working man and woman in the United States.
Undoubtedly (and unfortunately) more industrial disasters
like the Farmington explosion would gain for the occupational
safety and health movement the attention and action it merits.
In the absence of such cataclysmic horrors, the challenge which
the movement faces is to communicate the full sweep and depth
of the problem, which must be seen and understood in the per-
spective of its entirety as a prerequisite to the first steps toward
an effective solution.
Statistics are a beginning, and tell two stories: how bad things
appear to be, and how much worse they really are, when one takes
into account the widespread use of incomplete, misleading
methods of data collection.
The National Safety Council has reported that in 1968 indus-
trial accidents caused 14,300 deaths and 2.2 million disabling
work injuries; 245 million man-days lost because of disability;
$1.6 million in wage losses; $800 million in medical costs; and a
total cost to the economy in the amount of $7.9 billion.2 2 According
to the U. S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics, in
1958 manufacturing entailed an accident rate of 11.4 disabling
injuries per million man-hours worked. 3 By 1967 the rate had
18 For an extensive collection of newspaper articles describing the struggle for
health and safety in the coal mines, see CONG. REc. E6002 (daily ed. June 26,
1970); id. H3114 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1969); id. E2540 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 1969)-
id. H2383 (daily ed. March 31, 1969); id. E1271 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1969); id.
E749 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1969); see also comment, Mine Safety Legislation; A His-
tory of Neglect, 11 B.C. IND. & Comvr. L. REv. 31 (1909).
39 Hearings on S. 855, S. 467, S. 1094, S. 1178, S. 1800, S. 1907, Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1969); Hearings on H.R. 4047, H.R. 4295, H.R. 7976, Before the Gen-
eral Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1969).
20 Coal Mine Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 803 (Dec. 30, 1969).
21 See Burton v. Hickel, No. 861-70 (D.D.C., March 23, 1970); Porter, Nader
Accuses Interior of Evading Mine Safety Law, Washington Post, Aug. 7, 1970, at
A8, col. 1.
22 National Safety Council, Accident Facts 23-24 (1969).
23 BUREAU OF LABOR STAnsTics, U.S. DEP'T oF LABoR, REPORT No. 360
INJURY RATms 1 (1969), reprinted in 1969-70 Senate Hearings, pt. 2, at 1525.
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reached 14, up from 13.6 in 1966.24 Each of the twenty-one major
manufacturing groups surveyed by the Bureau had a higher
injury rate in 1967 than in 1965.25
Ten times as many man-days are lost from work-connected
disabilities as from strikes, and days of lost productivity as a result
of accidents and illnesses are ten times greater than the loss from
strikes.28
Industrial mishaps have produced annual fatalities which
exceed war deaths in Vietnam27 and Korea2 8 during comparable
periods. Ralph Nader's 1970 testimony before the Senate Sub-
committee on Labor, was more explicit as to the comparative
impact of occupational violence: "In the last three years the
fatality toll of riots in our cities has been 260 to 270 dead. Just
in total of fatalities from trauma on the job that amounts to 5 days'
toll in the occupational safety area."29
If these figures are disquieting, how much more so is the fact
that they reflect gross under-reporting? Dr. Jerome I. Gordon, in
a study just submitted to the Department of Labor, has concluded
that injury statistics compiled and published by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics [hereinafter referred to as BLS] and the National
Safety Council record a mere one-tenth of the actual injury toll 30
The measure which the BLS and the National Safety Council
use to calculate disabling injuries is the so-called Z16.1 standard
devised by the American National Standards Institute.8 1 The Z16.1
24 Id.
25 Id. BLS has just released its figures for 1968, which show that the accident
rate has remained at 14.0. BuREAu OF LABoR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
REPORT No. 379, INjLmy RATEs 1 (1970).
26 See H.R. Rep. No. 1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1970).
271d. at 14.
28 See H. SoMmns & A. SoMEas, supra note 5, at 6.
29 See 1969-70 Senate Hearings, pt. 1, at 647.
30 Gordon et al., An Evaluation of the National Industrial Safety Statistics
Program, Submitted to the Office of Planning, Wage and Labor Standards Ad-
ministration, U.S. Dept. of Labor, June 30, 1970; Professor Gordon's summary of
his findings is reprinted in CONG. REC. E7307 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1970).
31 See United States of America Standards Institute, Method of Recording and
Measuring Work Injury Experience (Dec. 27, 1967), reprinted in 1969-70 Senate
Hearings, pt. 2, at 1173. Subsequent to the publication of this pamphlet, the
United States of America Standards Institute changed its name to the American
National Standards Institute. See 1969-70 Senate Hearings, pt. 1, at 447-50.
Acording to Ralph Nader, "The name was changed under pressure by the Federal
Trade Commission who alleged that this was a deceptive practice in that it con-
fused a private organization with a governmental agency." Id. at 628-29. Cf.
LAQuE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE AmucAN NAT'L STANDARDs
INsTrrTE, reprinted in 1969 House Hearings, pt. 2, at 1167, 1174.
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definition of disabling injury excludes an injured employee who
can return to "any regularly established job" on the shift after
the one on which the accident occurred.32 Thus by re-assigning
injured workers to "soft" jobs, large firms can easily avoid re-
porting injuries. Exactly how this is being done came to light in
testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Labor. According
to corumentation supplied by the United Steelworkers of America,
in a number of instances at a particular plant injured workers were
given different job assignments and returned to work on crutches
on the day after their accidents while the company newsletter
continued to boast about the company's record of consecutive
hours without lost-time injuries. 3  Another union official, com-
menting on his company's receipt of an award for 2 million hours
without a lost-time accident, said "It is all walking wounded. That
is what we call it."
3 4
The Z16.1 standard excludes injuries incurred on a Friday if
the employee makes it back to work on his next shift on Monday. 5
The day of injury and the day on which the employee returns to
full-time work are not counted as days lost as a result of dis-
ability.
6
Specific evidence of the type of minimizing inherent in the BLS
and National Safety Council approach is observable in figures
obtained from two large companies which calculated injuries on
a different basis. For December, 1968, Martin-Marietta listed
eighty-nine "doctor cases," which they defined as involving more
than "routine first aid." Over the same period they reported seven
disabling injuries under the Z16.1 standard.
For 1968 Bethlehem Steel pegged at 13.20 injuries per million
32 American Standards Institute, supra note 31, at 8.
33 See 1969-70 Senate Hearings, pt. 1, at 695-97.
34Id. at 813. According to Fra Burke, Safety and Health Director of the
United Steelworkers of America,
In the steel industry it is a practice that when an employee is injured
they will administer first aid or hospitalization to the injured, then will
have his or her supervisor punch their time card, then have another
company representative go to the home of the injured employee, and
bring him or her to their place of employment so that this particular
accident cannot be recorded as a lost-time accident. 1968 House Hear-
ings at 528.
35 American Standards Institute, supra note 31, at 8.
36Id.
37 Letter from Milton Durham Corporate Director, Safety, Martin-Marietta
Corp., to Rep. Philip Burton, Aug. 15, 1969, and accompanying work injury
report.
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man-hours of work its own "serious injury index," which included
"all disabling work injuries (as defined in Z16.1) and all nondis-
abling work injuries which prevent the injured employee, for any
part of a turn following the turn on which he was injured, from
doing all or part of the job he was doing at the time of injury."
For the same period the firm's National Safety Council rate was
only 0.73.8 For 1967 Bethlehem calculated a rate of 7.37 for its
coal operations, but reported a frequency of 4.84 to the National
Safety Council."
The Gordon study reported that the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company recorded more than a 300% increase in their
internal company work injury experience after changing from the
Z16.1 measure to a modified version of the "serious injury index."'
More than 11 years ago the chairman of the American National
Standards Institute's Z16.1 Committee had this to say about the
standard:
As the safety movement developed . . . the emphasis on
accident prevention tended to concentrate in particular groups
of establishments, primarily the larger ones .... They took
the lead in accident prevention and began to utilize all of
the stimulants to effective action possible. This, inevitably,
led to the competitive approach. . . . Unfortunately, for the
statistician, these contests gave injury statistics in the indi-
vidual establishment a position of importance which had
not been contemplated when Z16.1 was first developed. In
effect, they lost their original purpose of measuring the need
for accident prevention and became measures of accomplish-
ment ...
In all honesty, we have to recognize that most of the specific
rules introduced into Z16.1 have the effect of reducing the
range of reportable injuries. In the aggregate, the effect of
these changes upon the range of reportable cases may be sub-
stantial. If we accept this premise, as I feel we must, all
of our statistical indications of improvement in the volume
3 8 Letter from R. F. Willey, Manager, Bethlehem Corp., to Rep. Philip Burton,
Aug. 20, 1969.
so id.
40See Gordon, Twenty-Five Million Industrial Iniuries a Year, reprinted in
CONG. REc. E7308 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1970).
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of work injuries become questionable. Have we really suc-
ceeded in bringing injury occurrence in manufacturing to
the lowest level in history or do our figures largely reflect
shifts in reporting rather than substantive improvement? Are
we, in effect, kidding ourselves? If so, we are doing a dis-
service to the safety movement.
41
The measurement of work injuries by the BLS suffers from
other serious shortcomings. The BLS reckons its anual rate from
data voluntarily submitted by some 65,000 business establish-
ments.42 A New York study which compared information sub-
mitted by the same establishments voluntarily to the BLS and as
required by law to the state Workmen's Compensation Board
revealed a considerable difference in work injury frequency rates.
In manufacturing, the rate derived under the BLS approach was
12; as derived from the New York Workmen's Compensation
Board's records it was 16. For construction the discrepancy was
27 to 43.44
Another suggestion of weakness, attributable to the BLS'
voluntary scheme of data collection, is the fact that after the 1968
congressional hearings on occupational safety and health the
number of establishments reporting information on industrial in-
juries to the BLS diminished quite substantially.
45
According to Dr. Gordon,
The 16 co-operating states that participate in the [BLS] pro-
gram . . .have on occasion "sabotaged" data collection by
refusing to mail out survey schedules and follow-up on re-
sponses. This has resulted in elimination of some important
industrial detail on work injuries and has seriously biased
survey results. 46
The BLS is well aware of inadequacy of their statistics. In-
deed, an Alice-in-Wonderland passage in a BLS handbook at-
41 Quoted in Pearce, Quality of Statistics on Work Injury Rates, paper pre-
sented at Interstate Conference on Labor Statistics, Knoxville, Tenn., July 9, 1959,
at 13, 14.
42 BuREAu OF LABoR STATiTsIcs, U.S. DEP'r OF LAop, REPORT No. 379, IN-
jtmy RIATs 3 (1970).
43 See 1969-70 Senate Hearings, pt. 1, at 205.
44id.
45 See statement of Dr. Jerome B. Gordon in 1969 House Hearings, pt. 1, at
667-68.
46 See Gordon, Twenty-Five Million Industrial Injuries a Year, supra note 40.
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tempts to turn black into white (or white into black) by con-
fessing failure as an indicia of success: "[W]hereas one might ex-
pect to breed a certain amount of doubt about a statistical survey
by revealing its lack of perfection, frankness about unavoidable
defects more often has the opposite effect and public confidence
in the work is reinforced in the process."4 7 Ralph Nader has
quoted from a BLS report in 1969 which took a somewhat less
sanguine view: "Regional directors, industry safety people and
safety engineers were nearly unanimous in the opinion that Bureau
of Labor Statistics figures were of little or no value."48
We have been thus far focusing on accident statistics. If one
compares these figures with data on occupational diseases, the
former emerge as merely inadequate and unreliable. The latter
are virtually non-existent. As Victoria M. Trasko, Special Assistant
to the Director of the Bureau of Occupational Health, noted in
her 1968 Report to the U.S. Department of Labor on Needs of
Occupational Health Program, "Despite scientific advances in
the medical and environmental control of specific occupational
diseases, the prevalence and incidence of occupational diseases
in the United States is completely unknown."49
An indication of the pathetic state of occupational disease
statistics emerges from the way the U.S. Public Health Service
arrives at its national figure of 336,000 cases annually. This total
is nothing more than a projection of the 27,000 cases reported in
1965 in California, the only state in the union with a compre-
hensive system of recording occupational diseases.50
Despite this lack of statistics, we do know that modem tech-
nology has converted the workplace into an invisible arena of
violence, subjecting worker to fumes, gases, dust, heat, noise
vibrations and a host of other exposures and stresses whose
harmful effects may be undetected or unknown. New, potentially
toxic chemicals find their way into industrial use at an estimated
47BuEAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 42, at 1.
48 See 1969-70 Senate Hearings, pt. 1, at 630.
4 9 
TRASKO, REPORT TO U.S. DEPAIITmENT OF LABOR ON NEEDS oF Occu-
PATrONAL HEALTH PRocRAm (1968).50 See PuBLIc HEALTH SEavicE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WEL-
FARE OCCuPATIONAL DISEASE: THE SILENT ENEMy 1 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
SmmENEmt-]; see also the testimony of Dr. William H. Stewart, U.S. Surgeon
General, 1968 House Hearings at 107.
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rate of one every twenty minutes.5' In many instances the crip-
pling effects of occupational exposures delay their appearance for
years, and may not become evident until after the worker changes
jobs or retires.
In recent years a number of occupational disease problems
have attracted public attention. These include:
Exposure to asbestos. One out of five deaths of asbestos work-
ers is attributable to lung cancer.5 2 This is seven times the normal
rate. One out of ten deaths results from asbestosis, a lung disease.
One out of seven or eight is due to mesothelioma, a rare malig-
nancy of the lung which affects one out of 10,000 in the general
population. It is well established that these diseases are caused
by continued exposure to asbestos dust.
Dr. Irving J. Selikoff, an authority on asbestosis, testified to
the Senate Subcommittee on Labor:
You may wonder why asbestos workers walk backwards.
They don't always walk backwards. It is only going upstairs.
They are so short of breath that after two steps they have to
sit down. It is easier to go up a flight of stairs backwards
then walking up. It is a terrible way to die.53
Dr. Selikoff also stated that "8 per cent of all deaths among
insulation workers in this country are due to a completely
preventable cause."54
Byssinosis or "brown lung" disease. Of over 240,000 active
textile workers in the United States, an estimated 17,000 have a
respiratory condition caused by the inhalation of dust generated
in the initial stages of the processing of cotton and other fibers.5
This condition, known as byssinosis, can cause disability or death.
It has been speculated that it afflicts more than 80,000 former
textile workers.56
51 SatE'r ENEmY 6.
52 Statisties on asbestos exposure are compiled from Snaurr ENs~nr 3; testi-
mony of Dr. Irving J. Selikoff, 1969-70 Senate Hearings, pt. 2, at :1072-85; see also
Brodeur, The Magic Mineral, NEw YoRxEn, Oct.1 12, 1968, at 117.
53 1969-70 Senate Hearings, pt. 2, at 1074.
54 Id. at 1073.
55 See 1969 House Hearings, pt. 2, at 880-2; 1969-70 Senate Hearings, pt. 1,
at 585-86, 990-98; see also id., pt. 2, at 1567-85.
56 Id.
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The attitude of the textile industry toward this disease is
encapsulated in the following comment which appeared in the
American Textile Reporter, an organ of the industry:
We are particularly intrigued by the term "Byssinosis," a
thing thought up by venal doctors who attended last year's
ILO [International Labor Organization] meeting in Africa
where inferior races are bound to be afflicted by new diseases
more superior people defeated years ago.
57
The Reporter goes on to prescribe chewing tobacco and snuff
for the treatment of "cotton fever," its euphemism for byssinosis. 8
These comments are not inconsistent with evidence that the
textile companies have been actively blocking evidence to study
the disease. 9
Pneumoconiosis or "black lung" disease. A U.S. Public Health
Service study revealed that throughout the Appalachian soft coal
region one of every ten active and one of every five former
miners show X-ray evidence of this chronic respiratory ailment.60
According to the Surgeon General, "Data from post mortem
examinations would indicate an even higher prevalence of this
disease." 61
Cadmium poisoning. Welders exposed to cadmium fumes risk
death or serious injury. These fumes have no pronounced odor
or immediate effect.62 A worker subjected to a severe exposure
will die within four to nine days.63 Thus it is probable that a
number of deaths from cadmium poisoning may go unrecognized.
Noise. The number of American workers exposing noise con-
57 Reprinted in 1969-70 Senate Hearings, pt. 1, at 999.
58 Id.
69 See letter from Dr. H. Karl Sessions, Director, Branch of Special Health
Services, Dep't of Public Health, Ga., to George Perkel, Research Director, Textile
Workers Union of America, Oct. 23, 1969, reprinted in 1969 House Hearings, pt. 2
at 905.60 See testimony of Dr. William H. Stewart, U.S. Surgeon General, Hearings
on S. 355, S. 467, S. 1094, S. 1178, S. 1300, S. 1907, S. 2118, S. 2284. Before
the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare,
91st Cony., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 720.611 I.
62 CALI:FORNA STATE DEmT oF HEALTH, OccupAIONAL, HEALTH ASPEcTS OF
CADmiuM INHALA roN PoisoNimG 4 (1969).6 3 CA~roa4 STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, OccuPAnoNAL HEALTH TECmcAL
INFORMATiON SEavIcE, CADmium PoiSNING 3 (1966).
64 PtiLC HEALTn SE VICE, U.S. DEP'T op HEALTE EDrCATIqN ANp WzL-
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ditions which may damage their hearing is estimated to be in
excess of six million, and may even reach sixteen million.64
Pesticide poisoning. Agricultural workers are constantly ex-
posed to toxic pesticides.65 The most poisonous are organic
phosphate insecticides, which are chemically related to nerve
gases and are fatal in small doses even when absorbed through
the skin.66 One doctor in Salud, California, tested twelve farm-
workers and found seven to be suffering from low-grade insectcide
poisoning. Between April and October, 1969, one out of three
workmen's compensation cases in Salud involved pesticide poi-
soning.6
8
Exposure to betanapthylamine. This dye ingredient is ab-
sorbed through the skin and gastro-intestinal tract, and causes
cancer of the bladder.69 Before its use was legally restricted in
Pennsylvania"0 it was responsible for at least eighty-nine cancer
cases in that state.7 1 DuPont Corporation reported several hun-
dred cancer cases before switching to available substitutes. 2
Although there is no known, safely allowable exposure to it,
73
betanaphthylamine is currently being produced by a small com-
pany in Georgia. 4
Radiation exposure. It is estimated that of 6,000 men who
have worked as uranium miners in the United States, between
600 and 1,100 will die during the next two decades because of
FARE, CoNSum PRoTEcIoN AmD ENvIRorNmNrAL HEALTH SERVICE, ISSUE
STuny ON NoIsE CoNTROL 7 (1969), reprinted in 1969-70 Senate Hearing at
1627, 1640. See also, Sr..Tr ENEMY 5: "Fifty per-cent of the machines in indus-
try generate noise levels potentially harmful to hearing."65 See, CALromA DE_"T oF PUBLIc HEALTH, See, BUREAU OF OCCUPATIONAL
HEATH AND ENvinoNmENTAL EPmEMoLoCY, OccUPATIoNAL DISEASE IN CAI-
FoRN.A ATTnmrrn To PESTICIDES AND OTHER AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS (1967)
reprinted in 1969 House Hearings at 1413. Id. at 1835-1473.
66 Id. at 1448.
67 id. at 1449.
68 Id. at 1451.
69 See, MANUFACTURING CHEMISTS Ass'N', CHEMICAL SA;ETY DATA SHEET-
B AN AmINE (adopted Apr. 1949), reprinted 1968 House Hearings 743.70 PA. DEa"T OF HEALTH, RULES AND REGULATIONS, ch. 4, art. 434 (April 25,
1968).71 Interview with John O'Neill, Industrial Hygienist, Office of Standards
Development, Bureau of Labor Standards in Washington, D.C., July 22, 1970.
Mr. O'Neill had previously served as an official in the Radiation Standards Div.
of the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry, the enforcement body
of the Pennsylvania Health Department.72 See, Testimony of Ralph Nader at 1969-70 Senate Hearings at 650.
73 See, MANUFACTURING CHEMIST Ass'N., supra note 69.
74 See, Montgomery, Georgia Factory Producing Chemical Outlawed in One
State as Cancer Cause, Atlanta Constitution, June 25, 1968, at 40, col. 4.
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radiation exposure. The principal cause of these deaths will be
lung cancer.
7 5
Of even greater significance than these public disclosures of
the growing dangers of occupational diseases is the fact that the
workers themselves are beginning to notice what is happening to
them, and to ask questions which convey considerable unease.
Recent statements by members of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic
Workers International Union illustrate this awakening conscious-
ness.
70
Peter MacIntyre, president of the chemical workers local in
Sayreville, New Jersey, asked his national union:
What can be done, what can be told about gases when they're
mixed together, such as chlorine and titanium tetrachloride?
Now we have operators who have been working with these
gases and fumes since 1961. We'd like to know what's hap-
pening to these people. Some of them have been taken out
of the plant. Some of them, nothing has ever happened to
them. We would like to know would wearing clothes that
smell from chlorine be dangerous? We have people who
continuously have their clothes saturated with the fumes of
chlorine.77
Another worker at a chemical plant in Linden, New Jersey,
asked the national union about the effects of acrylamide:
We've had six or seven people that have suffered strokes,
paralysis. One of the men became blind about a year ago.
Now this acrylamide is also used in all acrylic-based paints.
But what I'm interested in now, is finding out exactly
what the crippling effects of this acrylamide is. Because
everybody in this plant is exposed to this, due to the faulty
equipment that management has installed there. They're only
concerned with a production yield, not a safety standard.78
75 See Snr= ENEmy 3.
76 The Oil, Chemical and Atomic Worker's Int'l Union has published the
transcripts of eight regional conferences entitled Hazards in the Industrial En-
vironment. The transcripts contain comments and questions by workers about
dangers which they themselves perceive in their own workplaces.7 7 DisrucT 8 CouNcm, OIL, CHmEMCAL AND ATOMIC Woaxns INr'iL UNION,
HAzAIWs OF T INDusmrtAL ENvmoNrmN-r, at 33 (March 29, 1969); reprinted in
1969 House Hearings, pt. 2, at 1267.
7 8 HAzAWs OF = INDusTRIAL ENvaommN-r, supra note 78 at 31; 1969
House Hearings, supra note 78, at 1265.
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In the light of the foregoing, current efforts to protect the
health of the American worker are woefully inadequate. Accord-
ing to a pamphlet on occupational disease prepared by the U.S.
Public Health Service,
Industry spends an estimated $320 million annually for health
services and professional surveillance of plant environment.
However, no more than 20 percent of the total work force is
employed in plants where such services are provided. Four
out of five of the Nation's workers are employed in small
plants, which usually offer no health services at ally.9
At the state and municipal levels approximately five cents per
worker per year is expended for occupational health services.8s
In 1967 state and local governments employed only five hundred
people in occupational health and industrial hygiene to safeguard
eighty million workers."' According to an AFL-CIO survey, 25
states presently employ nearly 2,600 fish and game wardens.8 2
The federal government spends only $6 to $7 million annually
(or less than ten cents per worker) for occupational health and
safety research through Department of Health, Education and
Welfare programs.8
Most workers disabled by industrial acidents or diseases must
look to the state workmen's compensation statutes for medical
and cash benefits. The workmen's compensation system in the
United States will celebrate its sixtieth birthday in 1971. There
are those who are wont to extol workmen's compensation with
emotion-tinged rhetoric, and to decry any federal involvement in
compensating industrial disability as an evil intrusion to be
resisted at all costs. One will not find those most intimately
affected by the system-i.e., the workers-among these staunch
defenders of the status quo. For a quick look at the facts suggests
the conclusion that the workmen's compensation system has
reached its retirement age; or, at the very least, it desperately
needs help.
79 SnIr ENEMY 6.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 See, 1968 House Hearings at 711.88 Testimony of Dr. Roger 0. Egeberg, Ass't Secretary for Health and Sci-
entific Affairs, Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare, in 1969-70 Senate Hear-
ings pt. 1, at 156.
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It is generally recognized that cash benefits under workmen's
compensation should replace between one-half and two-thirds of
the injured employee's economic loss.84 A confidential, still-sup-
pressed report delivered to the President's Council of Economic
Advisors in August, 1968 by a Special Task Force on Workmen's
Disability Income discloses that in forty-three states the maximum
allowable 1968 workmen's compensation benefits for permanent
total disability did not meet the 1966 poverty standard-of-living
level as calculated by the Social Security Bulletin. 5
Prior analyses have likewise pointed out the failure of work-
men's compensation to provide adequate cash benefits to replace
wage losses. Thus, in 1962 in Illinois workmen's compensation
was found to pay for only eighteen per cent of the injured worker's
estimated present and future wage loss.8 A 1961 study found
that death benefits were similarly deficient. Using 1956 figures,
the study concluded that workmen's compensation benefits under
the California statute replaced a mere 12.2% of the medium net
loss suffered by the survivors of the victims of fatal industrial
accidents in that state.87 On a national level, thirty-three states
replaced 20% or less of the estimated loss.88
The Bureau of Labor Standards periodically publishes a list
of standards recommended for incorporation into the state com-
pensation statutes by groups such as the American Medical As-
sociation, the Council of State Governments and the Department
of Labor. In 1961, a comparison of nineteen model provisions
with the compensation acts of the 50 states, the District of
Columbia and Puerto Rico, revealed that of a total of 988 cate-
gories (19 standards multiplied by 52 jurisdictions), 58% failed to
meet the recommendations." In their 1967 publication, the
Bureau of Labor Standards used 16 model provisions. The 52
jurisdictions still scored a percentage of 58% deficientf 0 If one
8 4 See 1 A. LARsoN, supra note 5, at 1.85 BEsKowz Er A., THE Wonm~rNEs DisA~rrY INcomm SYstmh RECOM-
MEDATIONS FOR FEDERAL ACTiON 80-85 (Aug. 1968).
88 ILLwOiS INnusTmIL COM MN, ANNUAL REPoRT OF Com:EsABLr_ Woax
INJmIms 17 pt. II, (1963).
87 E. C=ar, supra note 5, at 62-88, 106-09.
88 Id.
89 DEP'T OF LABOR, U.S. BuREAu OF LABOR STANDARDS, BULL. No. 212 STATE
WomMEN's COMPENSATION LAws: A COMPARSON OF MAJOR P.OVISIONS Wrt
REcoMm-NDEm STANDARDS (rev. Dec. 1961).
901d. (rev. 1967).
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removes from the 1961 list the 3 standards not included in the
1967 list, the 1961 rating rises to a deficiency of 61%, which means
that measured by the 16 standards used in 1967, the 52 jurisdic-
tions made a 3% improvement in 6 years-not exactly what one
would call an encouraging performance.
It would be impossible to overemphasize the stark fact that in
a span of nearly six decades of existence the workmen's com-
pensation system in the United States has progressed only to the
point of being 58% deficient. The present status of occupational
safety and health must also be viewed in the light of the more than
half century which public and private groups have had to struggle
against the ravages of industrial accidents and diseases. The con-
clusion is inescapable that the traditional approaches have had
enough time, and have proved unequal to the task at hand.
In his testimony before the House Select Subcommittee on
Labor on February 1, 1968, then Secretary of Labor W. Willard
Wirtz recognized the critical role of an underlying philosophy
toward industrial safety and health:
The mechanics were in charge of the industrial revolution.
The humanists are asserting, against even stronger forces,
their authority in the technological revolution. Life and limb
were considered an acceptable price of progress during that
period when even the optimists' philosophy was embodied in
a phrase about the "inevitability of progress." But we are
no longer determinists. We have accepted human responsi-
bility for shaping not only the course but the quality of
progress. A higher value is placed now on a life, a limb, an
eye.91
Throughout the formative era of American industry, progress
was considered inevitable, and occupational accidents were viewed
as inevitable byproducts of progress. 92 Yet historical determinism
911968 House Hearing 12.
92 "Society never has advanced, and, so far as we can now see, it will
never advance, without blood. When our ancestors made war their prin-
cipal business, there was blood. And when we, their descendants, when
we devote ourselves to manufacture and commerce, when we invent
and operate complicated, gigantic machinery, there is still blood. We
may diminish the volume of that red torrent, but we cannot stop its flow.
The accident is an inevitable incident of business." Hard, The Law of
the Killed and the Wounded, EVEYBoDy's MAGAZIN, Sept., 1908, at 361.
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seems to beg the question. It smacks of testimony before a Con-
gressional investigating committee in 1912 by a U.S. Steel execu-
tive, who answered complaints about excessive hours in the steel
industry with the pious explanation that hours were set "by the
laws of nature."9 3
There was nothing inevitable about the formulation and
execution of the rules of law relating to industrial accidents. Leg-
islatures and courts faithfully reflected the interests of those who
dominated the economy, and who were not in the least willing to
have the cost of work injuries interfere with profits and growth.
They held to the proposition that property rights took precedence
over human rights, an ethic which permeated the entire social
fabric in the nineteenth century.
To sanction this policy of shielding industry from the burden
of industrial mishaps, the courts applied legal principles which
made it virtually impossible for injured workers to shift their
losses to the enterprises which employed them.9 4 A suit for money
damages required that the employee establish negligence on the
part of the employer.95 In addition to his opportunity to contest
allegations of negligence, the employer could assert any of three
legal defenses which, if proven, would completely exonerate him.
He could argue that the accident had been caused, in whole or in
part, by the employee's own negligence; that the employee had
willingly encountered the employment hazard which caused the
accident; or that a fellow-employee was responsible for the
injury.D
Each of these defenses is highly vulnerable to criticism. In
situations where the employee's negligence was very slight-
momentary inadvertence, perhaps-in comparison with the em-
ployer's maintenance of unsafe machinery or working conditions,
it was manifestly unfair to deny the employee any recovery at all,
especially if his injuries were serious. In addition, as one writer
noted in 1910 in describing several categories of worker negligence
93 Quoted in D. BRODY, STEELWORKERS IN AMERICA: THE NoNUNION EiA 34
1969).
94 See, e.g., Brodie, The Adequacy of Workmen's Compensation As Social
Insurance: A Review of Developments and Proposals, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 67, 68.
95 See generally, W. ThossER, TORTS ch. 15 (3d ed. 1964).
96 Id. at 549.
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in the steel industry, "human powers of attention, universally
limited, are in [the worker's] case further limited by the conditions
under which work is done-long hours, heat, noise, intense speed.
For the reckless ones we maintain that natural inclination is in their
case encouraged and inevitably increased by an occupation in-
volving constant risk; recklessness is part of the trade."
7
In applying the doctrine of assumption of the risk, the courts
took the position that by remaining on the job in the face of
known dangers, the worker somehow bargained away his right
to recover damages from the employer.98 Inherent in this doctrine
was the notion that the worker, if he did not wish to assume the
risk, could always quit his job and move to another. In the light
of the harsh realities of economic conditions during this era and
the uniformity of dangerous machinery and work practices in
every industry, this reasoning was untenable.
The so-called "fellow-servant rule" was the most indefensible
of the three defenses. To bar recovery to an employee injured by
the negligence of a co-worker made no sense at all, except as a
blatant device to protect employers from legal liability.99
Though damage suits usually took the form of trials by jury,
the presiding judge could direct a verdict for the employer if he
found that as a matter of law the employer was not negligent,
or that one of the three defenses was applicable. In this way the
trial judge could eliminate the possibility that jurors might
sympathize with the injured worker and might bend legal rules
in order to do justice.
A final factor which militated against the worker with a valid
claim was the law's delay.1"' It might take two years or more
before his lawsuit was scheduled for trial. This placed upon him
a serious financial hardship, which attorneys for the employer
often exploited by postponing and stretching out the trial as long
as possible. The result was that the worker was generally forced,
because of economic hardship, to settle his claim for a fraction of
97 C. EASTMAN, WORx-AcclDENTS AND T=E LAw 95 (1910); see also Hard,
Making Steel and Killing Men, EVERYBODY'S MAGAZINE, Nov. 1907, at 579, 587
(... . recklessness is certainly a psychological characteristic of men in steel plants.
All tradition teaches them to be reckless.")
98 W. Possma, supra note 95, at 550.
99 Id. at 552; but cf. Pound, The Economic Interpretation and the Law of
Torts, 53 HARv. L. REv. 365 (1940).
100 Hard, supra note 92.
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what it was worth. Since he also had to pay his own lawyer, his
final recovery was hardly adequate. 01
Various estimates have been made, ranging from 70 to 94 per
cent of the accident and death claims which the common law left
uncompensated.10 2 From 1906 to 1912, the U.S. Steel Corporation
is said to have lost no more than six verdicts.103 "During the year
ending July 1907, Jones & Laughlin paid nothing to the families of
seven, funeral expenses for ten, and over a thousand dollars to
only two families of its toll of twenty-five dead. In Allegheny
County 88 out of 158 injured married men received no compensa-
tion, and 23 of 33 men permanently disabled were given less than
one hundred dollars." 0 4
From the employer's point of view, therefore, the cost of
industrial accidents was hardly onerous. Most companies pur-
chased liability insurance, which included the services of insurance
company lawyers to defend against claims. Approximately one-
third of their premium dollar went to pay claims by injured
workers, with the remainder eaten up by the insurer's expenses
and profit.10 5 The big companies were self-insurers, which meant
that they paid their own lawyers and liability claims. With such
little economic incentive for safety, it is easy to see how employers
came to consider industrial accidents as "inevitable."
Another important causative factor underlying the plight of
work accident victims was the prevalent philosophy of "rugged
individualism." In the early days of industrial development in the
United States, private initiative served as the handmaiden of
progress. The "Horatio Alger" ethic held that any individual
could achieve financial prosperity if he worked hard enough at it.
Personal responsibility for success implied personal responsibility
for failure, from which it followed, albeit tenuously, that industrial
accidents were failures for which the worker should be held
responsible. The legal principles governing work accidents re-
flected this attitude, which took root in the days of the small work
shop. The courts were unwilling to adapt these principles to the
increasing complexities of the manufacturing process, which put
101 W. PnossEa, supra note 95, at 554.
102 Id. at 554 n. 97.
103 D. BRoDY, supra note 93, at 92.
104 Id.
105 H. SomEs & A. SomEms, supra note 5, at 24.
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working conditions far beyond the control of the individual
worker.
In addition, "rugged individualism" did not contribute to
safety in the steel industry because of the practice of appointing
to supervisory positions men who had come up through the ranks
on their own initiative and merit.10 These supervisors had per-
sonally run all the risks of injury and death inherent in the in-
dustry, and had become hardened to them. Their stomachs did
not turn at the sight of mangled or charred bodies. For them
the task at hand was to keep production up and costs down.
They could hardly be expected to promote safety in the plants.
The wide exploitation of immigrant labor also contributed to
the precedence of property rights over human rights in the field
of work safety. The prevalent attitude toward immigrants was
brilliantly captured in a 1911 muckraking magazine describing the
author's visit to the office of a construction engineer overlooking
a recently excavated railroad cut:
"To think," I exclaimed, "that not a man was killed!"
"Who told you that?' asked the young assistant.
"Why, it's here in this report sent to the newspapers by
your press-agent. He makes a point of it."
The young assistant smiled. 'ell, yes, I guess that's
right," he replied. "There wasn't anyone killed except just
wops."
"Except what?"
'ops. Don't you know what wops are? Dagos, niggers
and Hungarians-the fellows that did the work. They don't
know anything, and they don't count."
0 7
Foreign workers arriving in the great waves of immigration
at the turn of the century were quickly converted into industrial
106 Hard, supra note 97, at 579.
107 Dosch, just Wops, EviRyBoDY'S MAGAZINE, Nov. 1911, at 579; see also, A.
HAMILTON, EXPLORING THE DANcmous TRADES 151-52 (1943):
Yesterday I visited doctors and druggists and hospitals [in Colorado dur-
ing 1910"s]. I am amazed to see how lightly lead poison is taken here.One would tbink I was inquiring about mosquito bites. When I asked an
apothecary about lead poisoning 
in the neighborhood of the 
smelter,
be said he had never know a case. I explained that that was incredible
and he said: ,Oh, maybe you 
the thinking of the Wops and 
Hunkies.
I guess there's plenty among them. I thought you meant white men."
Dr. Hamilton was a pioneer in the field of industrial medicine.
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cannon fodder. Coming from peasant societies, unable to speak
English, they greased the wheels of industry with their blood.
The accident rate for non-English speaking employees at the
South Works [steel mill] from 1906 to 1910 was twice the
average of the rest of the labor force. Almost one-quarter
of the recent immigrants in the works each year-3,273 in the
five years-were injured or killed. In one year 217 Eastern
Europeans died in the steel mills of Allegheny County.108
Because of language problems and unfamiliarity with the law
foreign born accident victims and their families found it uncom-
monly difficult to press legal claims against their employers. 10 9
The muckrakers focused most of their fire on the financial
plight of the injured worker, and tended to slight the problem
of industrial accident prevention. This may have been due in
part to the prevailing belief that work mishaps were inevitable,
and in part to the assumption that making employers pay for the
costs of these mishaps would sufficiently motivate them to reduce
the frequency and severity of work injuries.
Some of the states did enact safety laws, dating from the
passage in 1877 of a Massachusetts statute requiring factory safe-
guards. 10 But effective enforcement was something else. A 1910
survey of the situation in Pennsylvania concluded that state safety
inspectors were too few and were politically appointed; they were
not very zealous about their work and failed even to keep public
records of prosecutions of safety code violations."'
Prior to 1911, various efforts were made to ameliorate the
ravages of industrial accidents. Many states passed employer
liability laws which modified the common law rules and made
it easier for injured employees to recover damages from their
employers." 2 Groups of workers pooled their scant resources to
establish funds from which they or their families might draw
modest payments in the event of disability or death. Some of the
larger companies furnished medical and financial benefits to in-
jured employees without regard for fault. U.S. Steel sensitive to
108 D. BRODY, supra note 93, at 100.
109 Id., at 101.
11o MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 214 (1877).
111 C. EAsa'rimr, supra note 97.
12 See J. TurNBuI.L et al., supra note 9, at 259-60.
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the winds of impending reform, began an extensive safety program
in 1908, and two years later introduced its own compensation
plan for industrial accident victims.13
But these piece-meal measures proved pathetic in the face of
an occupational accident toll which reached staggering propor-
tions in the first decade of the twentieth century. The year 1907
was particularly grim. There were 3,242 fatalities in the anthracite
and bituminous coal mines.114 On December 6, 361 men were
killed in a mine explosion in Mononghah, West Virginia."
Thirteen days later, a mine explosion in Jacobs Creek, Pennsyl-
vania, claimed 239 lives." 6
Crystal Eastman's book, Work-Accidents and the Law, became
a best seller 17 and helped fuel popular indignation. Especially
effective was the front piece," S a calendar dating from July 1906
to June 1907. Under each day was a check-mark for each indus-
trial death occurring that year in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania,
the heartland of the American steel industry. The relentless con-
sistency of the daily toll, and the final total, 526, conveyed a
gruesome message.
Statistics told only part of the story, for it was a matter of
common knowledge that a substantial number of industrial injuries
and deaths went unreported." 9 This was particularly true with
regard to occupational diseases, many of which were unrecognized
as such.
Several states appointed commissions to study the industrial
accident problem.120 They paid specific attention to reforms
which had been initiated by Bismarck in Germany in 1884, and in
113 See D. BRODY, supra note 93, at 164-68.
114 BuREAu OF Mmws, DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BuLL. 481; HARINcToN, EAST
& WR cimc, SAFTY nT TH MINm Iwusm 6 (1950).
115 Id. at 25.
116 Id.
117 See H. Som:ERs & A. SoMERS, supra note 5, at 30.
118 C. EASTMAN, supra note 97, at ii.
119 See Hard, Making Steel and Killing Men, EvERmony's MAGAznE, Nov.
1907, at 579. See also U. SiNcLAra, supra note 4, at 115:
It was said by the boss at Durham's that he had gotten his week's money
and left there. That might not be true, of course, for sometimes they
would say that when a man had been killed; it was the easiest way out
of it for all concerned. When, for instance, a man had fallen into one
of the rendering tanks and bad been made into pure leaf lard and
peerless fertilizer, there was no use letting the fact out and making
hsfamily unhappy.12 0 See J. TuUNBuLL et al., supra note 9, at 260-61; see also W. DODD,
ADmNISTRATION OF WOEvmNm'S COMPENSATION 19-26 (1936).
[Vol. 59
SYMPOSIUM ON WoR v's COMPENSATION
England in 1897. The latter became the model for a proposed
new approach to industrial accidents in the United States-work-
men s compensation.
A statement attributed to England's Lloyd George nicely
encapsulates the underlying philosophy of workmen's compensa-
tion: "The cost of the product should bear the blood of the
workman.' 21 Under this new system the employer would be
liable, regardless of fault, for worker injuries and deaths "arising
out of and in the course of the employment," but would pay to
the employee or his family cash benefits limited by statute, as
opposed to the full compensatory damages recoverable under
the common law.122 This formula involved a quid pro quo: the
employer gave up his common law defenses, while the worker
surrendered the possibility of obtaining full damages. Thus the
costs of work accidents would pass to the employer, who could
then absorb them by adjusting the price of his product. In
addition, claims under workmen's compensation were to be
processed by an administrative agency, which would hopefully
grant prompt recoveries to workers whose injuries were covered
by the act.
Congress passed a workmen's compensation statute for federal
employees in 1908.23 Two years later New York enacted the first
state workmen's compensation act, which the New York Court of
Appeals held unconstitutional.124 But several other states passed
their own compensation acts in 1911, and these as well as a sub-
sequent, revised New York compensation statute overcame con-
stitutional objections and were upheld by the courts. 2 5 By 1920
all but eight of the states had passed workmen's compensation
laws.12
6
The new statutes did not cover every worker or every occu-
pation. But they did shift from employee to employer a sub-
stantial part of the total economic burden of industrial accidents,
and thereby reduced to a tolerable level a problem which had
previously reached critical dimensions.
121 See W. PNossER, supra note 95, at 554.
122 See note 5 supra.
123 Act of May 30, 1908, ch. 236, 35 Stat. 556.
124 Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911).
125 See J. Tuar.muu et al, supra note 9, at 262-63.
1 2 6 See W. MALONE & M. PLANT, CASES AND MATEmRLs ON WORKMEN'S
COMNENSAaION 62 (1963).
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Though accident frequency rates showed a marked decrease
after the enactment of the new legislation,27 it has proved
impossible to document any clear relationship between work-
men's compensation and work safety. Professor Walter F. Dodd,
reviewing the situation 1936, concluded: "The operating forces
which, since 1911, may have produced increase or decrease of
industrial injuries are not capable of measurement; but it is per-
haps safe to say that workmen's compensation has had little effect
upon the result." 12 8 But in the years immediately following the
enactment of the new laws, there were many who resorted to post
hoc, ergo propter hoc reasoning and hailed their salutary effect
upon accident rates. 29
The passage of workmen's compensation acts did not mark a
revolutionary change in values, nor signal the end of the ascen-
dancy of property rights over human rights. Though the hu-
manitarian aspects of the new statutes were often proclaimed,
the truth of the matter is that workmen's compensation made
excellent business sense, and for that reason powerful business
interests backed its adoption.8 0
Popular dissatisfaction with existing methods of work-accident
prevention and compensation had reached such a level that some
reform was inevitable. Businessmen feared the liberalization of
employer's liability laws, which would have limited the employer's
common law defenses and made it much easier for injured workers
to recover full compensatory damages.' 3 ' Workmen's compen-
sation would be much less costly to industry, particularly since it
would be relatively easy to keep compensation benefits at a low
level.
The pre-existing system had been the cause of great dissatisfac-
tion among workers. This was a time when labor unions were
beginning to grow in strength and militancy. Far-sighted business
leaders saw the need to eliminate sources of conflict between labor
127 See J. Tur.NBTLL et al., supra note 9, at 284-86.
128 W. DODD, supra note 120, at 698.
129 See Andrews, Relation of Workmen's Compensation to Accident Pre-
vention, 123 ANNArs 205 (1926).
3.0 See generally J. W-zsT~w, THE ComoRAE IDEAL iN THE LmmuL STATE
40-61 (1968).
131 Id. at 45.
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and capital, and to deprive the emerging labor movement of its
best issues."3 2
From the business point of view governmental regulation, if
unavoidable, is best tolerable at the state level. It was no great
problem for business interests to see to it that state legislatures
kept workmen's compensation benefits and coverage at the lowest
possible levels. The abundance of high-powered legal talent at
the service of industry and the absence of countervailing repre-
sentation for the injured worker helped to produce state court
decisions which interpreted the compensation statutes in a restric-
tive way.
a
3
The enactment of workmen's compensation also took most
of the steam from the pressures upon industry to make the work-
place safer. As we have indicated, people assumed that the new
compensation laws caused accident rates to decrease. There was
no urgent necessity, therefore, to seek more comprehensive gov-
ernment regulation of industrial safety and health.
Industry had begun to understand that the true cost of work
accidents included property damage, disruption of the work
process after an accident and the expense of training replace-
ments when skilled workers were disabled or killed. Therefore
a number of large companies initiated their own safety move-
ments.13 4 They were motivated by self-interest, as expressed by
Judge Elbert H. Gary, a pioneering safety crusader, who promised
the board of directors of U.S. Steel, "If you will back us up in it
[a proposed safety drive], we'll make it pay."135
Thus the enactment of workmen's compensation laws and the
safety movements generated by business groups derived from
dollars-and-cents judgments reflecting a more rational application
of the same property-oriented philosophy which produced deplor-
able conditions in factories and workshops at the turn of the
century. This "more rationar' approach has led to the deplorable
conditions which have come to light in the past two years in the
course of investigations into occupational safety and health.
132 Id. at 54.
133 See MARCUS, ADVOCATING THE RIGHTS OF THE INJURED, IN OCCUPATIONAL
DIsABIrry AND PUBLC Poucy 77 (Cheit & Gordon eds. in 1963).
'34 See Palmer, History of the Safety Movement, 123 ANNALS 9 (1926).
135 Id. at 19.
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It seems evident, therefore, that to achieve an environment
that will satisfy contemporary demands for justice in the work-
place, we must understand that in the past regulation of work
conditions has never forced industry to transcend the bounds
of self-interest, and that in matters of safety and health employees
have been forced to rely primarily upon decisions made by
employers and based upon considerations of cost. The task at
hand is to free occupational safety and health from the shackles
of the cost-benefit approach, as determined by industry on the
basis of profitability, and to mobilize all available resources to
bring all available pressure upon all the causes of accidents and
diseases throughout the total work environment.
A Wonms' BiLL OF HEALTa RIGHTs
The time has come to place the interests of the worker in
health and safety above the interests of property. A program to
provide real protection for American workers must begin with a
recognition that every worker has the basic right to job conditions
which safeguard, to the maximum extent possible, his full physical,
biological, social and psychological health.
To realize this ultimate goal, we recommend consideration of
the following specifics as indispensable elements of a worker's
bill of health rights:
1. The Right to Protection from Job Hazards. Every worker
has the right to maximum feasible protection from the risk of
illness or injury partially or wholly caused by the hazards of his
work environment or the nature of his job.
2. The Right to Work Without Fear. Every worker has the
right to a job environment designed and engineered to provide
a maximum feasible protection from job hazards, and to protective
equipment designed to operate with a minimum of discomfort
and effort on the part of the worker himself.
3. The Right to Medical Information About Himself. Every
worker has the right to receive from his employer a physical
examination and appropriate medical tests, treatment and full
results of any diagnosis by a qualified physician of his choice (a)
at least annually, and (b) whenever his job subjects him to the
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risk of disease or injury through exposure to harmful agents in
excess of recommended exposures or standards. The worker
must also be informed of any personal or constitutional char-
acteristic, genetic or acquired, which may predispose him to
increased vulnerability to specific occupational stresses or hazards.
In the event the worker is killed on the job, his family has the
right to have an autopsy performed on him by a qualified "occu-
pational pathologist," (a pathologist qualified to recognize occu-
pational disease), and to all tissue analyses necessary to evaluate
the presence of occupational morbidity.
4. The Right to Information About All Potential Job Hazards.
Every worker has the right to be informed of all potential hazards
to his health and safety associated with his workplace or with the
performance of his job. The worker therefore has the right to be
informed of, and have easy access to all epidemiological and en-
vironmental data collected by the company or its consultants
which is not medically confidential, and to all studies made with
this data. The worker therefore has the right to be fully informed
of the nature of all the medical illnesses, signs, syndromes, sym-
toms, consequences, complications, conditions and disabilities
which are known or thought to be caused by, contributed to, or
associated with the hazards to which the worker is potentially
exposed.
5. The Right to Have Known or Fixed Dangers Clearly De-
scribed by the Employer. Every worker has the right to a job
and work environment where all substances and conditions, which
individually or in combination are potentially hazardous to the
worker, are measured regularly, labelled and accompanies by
warnings and instructions by the employer. This will enable the
worker and his employer to maintain full awareness of potential
hazards, and should assure control of these hazards within safe
limits. Information on labels, warnings and instructions must in-
clude where possible:
(a) Quantitive analysis of the contents if available;
(b) A description of the conditions under which the sub-
stance, the environment, and the worker may interact
to endanger the worker;
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(c) A description of toxic signs and symptoms;
(d) A statement of emergency treatment in event of
acute exposure of toxicity;
(e) A statement of proper conditions and precautions for
safe use.
6. The Right to Have Variable Dangers Measured Regularly.
Every worker has the right to be told by his employer: (a) the
measurable level of his daily exposure to potentially dangerous
experiences, and (b) the specific instances when his exposure
exceeds the lowest established limits to those substances or
processes.
7. The Right to Discover and Preserve a Record of Job Haz-
ards. Every worker has the right to photograph, measure, and
document the environmental conditions and job stresses to which
he is or has been exposed. Any worker may execute this right
himself or through a representative, but solely for health, safety,
and compensation purposes.
8. The Right to Corroboration of Information and Enforce-
ment of Standards. Every worker has the right to have his work-
place open to inspection, measurement, evaluation, and enforce-
able correction by federal, state and local departments of occu-
pational health and safety. This includes the right to know when
the inspection will occur, and to be informed of the total results
of any such inspection report. This also includes the right to a
confidential coiference with inspection personnel at a time other
than during job hours, the right to request and receive an inspec-
tion by filing a complaint, the right to submit himself to physical
examination and medical tests performed by qualified govern-
ment personnel, without loss of pay or fear of reprisals, and the
right to obtain a copy of the results of any such inspection.
9. The Right to be Protected and to Protect Himself. Every
worker has the right not to be subjected to excess exposure to
substances which have been shown to be potentially dangerous.
He also has the right not to be exposed to substances which have
not been sufficiently tested for acute and chronic toxicity sufficient
for the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to set
interim standards for exposure. Nor shall any worker be subject
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to exposure to any substance which has not been registered with
the federal government and independently studied, and a standard
approved and licensed by a qualified federal health agency for
safe use.
If such standards or a worker's rights as defined above are
violated, every worker so affected has the right to refuse to work
or remain in a hazardous environment until it is made safe. This
act in the defense of his health or safety shall not result in loss of
employment, pay or benefits, constitute a contract violation, or
be otherwise subject to reprisal.
10. The Right to Limit to Working Hours Hazardous Work
Exposures. Every worker has the right to be as clean and uncon-
taminated when he leaves the workplace as he is when he arrives.
The worker shall have the right to whatever necessary protective
clothing, protection, and hygiene facilities are necessary to assure
this right to avoid contamination by hazardous processes or sub-
stances, and the means to decontaminate himself for meals be-
tween work hours and after work is completed for the day.
Cleaning of contaminated work clothing shall be the responsi-
bility of the employer.
11. The Right to Recover for Damages Resulting From Viola-
tion of Standards. Every employee has the right, notwithstanding
his receiving disability compensation, to bring an action against
his employer either in a court of law or in a duly constituted
tribunal, for the entire value of damages resulting from injury,
illness, or damage to the worker's health due in part or in whole
to environmental conditions or the stresses of a job which have
not met established health and safety standards, criteria, codes,
contracts and public warnings by government and professional
departments and organizations qualified to recommend safe expo-
sure limits for fully protecting the health and safety of workers.
Any such recovery would be reduced by the amount an employee
receives under any workmen's compensation award.
12. The Right to Recover the Full Value of Health Damaged
by Employer Failures. Every employee has the right, notwith-
standing receiving disabilities or workmen's compensation, to
bring an action against his employer either in a court of law or
in a duly constituted tribunal, for the full value of damaged health
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if the employer failed to provide the worker any of these health
rights. Any such recovery shall be reduced by any other recovery
under the Workmen's Compensation law.
13. The Right to Recover for Hidden or Delayed Injuries to
Health. When a worker experiences illness, injury, disability or
pathological changes impairing health, as shown by autopsy, he,
or his representative in the case of his death, shall have the right,
notwithstanding the passage of time, to sue for damages if his
damage has resulted from previous occupational exposure.
14. The Right to Recover an Adequate Level of Workmen's
Compensation for All Job-Related Health Impairments. Just as
every worker has the right to receive a minimum wage, he should
receive workmen's compensation adequate for survival for all job
related violence. Within three years, the minimum workmen's
compensation schedule in each state should be made equivalent
in terms, conditions and benefits to that received by federal em-
ployees from the U.S. Government. To that end, federal legisla-
tion should be passed to require all state programs to reach this
minimum humane level.
15. Every Worker Has the Right to Receive Health and Life
Insurance Equivalent to the True and Complete Value of His Life
to Him and to His Family, From His Employer at a Rate Equiv-
alent To That Which Federal Employees Receive.
16. Every Worker Has The Right to Bargain for Stricter
Standards Than Those Established or Provided by Law.
EDrro's COMMENT: This article is adapted from the forthcom-
ing Ralph Nader Report on Occupational Safety and Health, spon-
sored by the Center for the Study of Responsive Law, Washing-
ton, D. C., and researched by a task force of "Nader's Raiders."
Mary Win O'Brien of the Georgetown University Law Center,
Richard Scheck of Harvard Law School, and Katherine Stone, all
members of the task force, assisted in the preparation of this
article. The Nader Report on Occupational Safety and Health
will be published by Grossman Publishers, Inc.
